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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 15/07/2011

Accident number: 760

Accident time: 11:55

Accident Date: 06/05/2009

Where it occurred: AF/0308/01635/[Demin
ing group]-MF 027,
Jan Qadam, Qala-eAhmad Khan Village,
Bagram district

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 14/06/2009

ID original source: None

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PMN-2 AP blast

Ground condition: not recorded
Date last modified: 15/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate training (?)
use of shovel (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)

Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting
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being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more
information becomes available.
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

File date: 14th June 2009
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT-03 DEMINING ACCIDENT
INTRODUCTION:
An investigation team was convened by the AMAC Central region to investigate the de-mining
accident involving [the Victim] the De-miner of [Demining group] DT-03. The accident
occurred at 11:55 hours on 06 May 2009 at minefield number AF/0308/01635/[Demining
group]-MF 027, located in Jan Qadam area of Qala-e-Ahmad Khan village, Bagram district of
province.
SUMMARY:
Minefield # AF/0308/01635/[Demining group]-MF027 is an anti-personnel contaminated site
around Bagram Airbase. A mine belt was established by Russian forces in order to secure the
Airbase from the attacks of Mujahedeen. [Demining group] has been sub-contracted by
coalition forces to clear certain tasks around Bagram Airbase. MF # 027 is one of the
contracted tasks to be cleared by [Demining group]. On 06th of May 2009 around 11:55 hrs
[the Victim] the deminer of DT-03 was busy in excavation of a detected signal, his excavation
tool touched a PMN2 mine and caused it to explode. As a result the deminer got some
injuries on his neck.
According to the investigation report and as seems from the pictures of scene, the deminer
was working with a big shovel. On 19th of April 09 one of the MACCA operations assistant
found the team using big shovel and raised a non-conformity report, but the team leader and
then the operations officer of [Demining group] did not accept the non-conformity report.
However the problem was showed to be solved during the re-audit visits, but in reality it had
not been solved and consequently the accident occurred.
CONCLUSIONS:
Obvious negligence of [Demining group] team from adherence to SOP and inattention of their
operations department with regard to the use of non standard tools caused the accident to
occur.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
The [Demining group] operations department should take necessary action in order to stop
using big shovels during the excavation.
MACCA expectation from [Demining group] management is to come up with a management
solution to this problem and present their plan of action, for preventing recurrence of such
accidents in the future, to the MACCA Chief of Operations by no later than 22nd of June
2009.
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Victim Report
Victim number: 948

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Not recorded

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: minor Neck
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. ". . some injuries on his neck".

Analysis
The primary and cause of this accident is listed as a Management Control Inadequacy
because the international demining group’s Operations Manager refused to stop using a tool
that the National Mine Action Authority maintained was dangerous, and seems to have
compounded this error by trying to pretend otherwise. The secondary cause is listed as
Inadequate equipment because the tool was not fit for purpose. [It is possible to expose a
mine cautiously with a large shovel (see the excavation analysis in the GICHD Manual
Demining Study) but only if it is used in the right way during area excavation, not metaldetector signal investigation.]
Neck injury is unusual, but so is using a shovel to expose a metal-detector reading. The
investigators failed to record the PPE in use, which should have included (in Afghanistan at
this time) a visor and frontal body protection that overlapped with the visor, so making neck
injury hard to explain.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report: the summary provided does not list the PPE used, injuries or MEDEVAC details, and
so is inadequate. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make Board of Inquiry reports
widely available for some years, so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy
that the Afghan national staff have been more responsible over this than those internationals
who presume greater responsibility.
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